E-Book
Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics
ISBN : 9781009472319
Author : Mendoza-Palacios
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Year : 2024
Language : English
Type : E-book
Description : Summary This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.
RECOMMENDED BOOKS
Research with International Students
Jenna Mittelmeier
Genetics and the Politics of Security
Joëlle Vailly
The Gift of Transformative Leaders
Hatch
Wild Mushrooms and Health Diversity, Phytochemistry, Medicinal Benefits, and Cultivation
Kamal Semwal
Corpus Linguistics for Oral History
Chris Fitzgerald
Biomaterials and Tissue Engineering
Oguzhan Gunduz
Data Science for Effective Healthcare Systems
Hari Singh
Sustainable Energy Branding
Fridrik Larsen